Coalition government: lessons from near and far

Monday, May 24, 2010

Experience of coalitions has shown that providing too much detail or too little detail up-front can be equally problematic, writes the Hansard Society's Dr Ruth Fox

It is quite difficult to draw specific lessons from the experience of other hung Parliaments around the world. Each case is sui generis: different electoral systems, the variable size of the legislatures, and whether the Parliament is unicameral or bicameral all impact on the outcome. The specific nature of the political and constitutional history surrounding the legislature and the possible existence of pre-election party alliances are also factors which make it difficult to draw directly transferable lessons between one country and another.

A deal having now been struck at Westminster it is possible to look at subsequent stages of a coalition arrangement (management of and then exit from it), and broadly draw on parallel experiences that might influence thinking about the decisions and direction of the new Conservative-Liberal coalition.

One of the keys to managing a coalition is the nature of the detailed policy deal between the parties concerned. The initial Conservative-Liberal coalition agreement outlines areas of consensus as well as making clear where red lines have been drawn and the parties have agreed to disagree, and where the Liberal Democrats have secured the right to opt out of collective responsibility. A further more detailed statement filling in the detail of the coalition agreement has also been produced.

The devil is always in the detail but international experience suggests that, policy differences aside, the scale and level of detail set out in the agreement can itself prove to be a double-edged sword. A detailed outline, such as the 65-page coalition agreement following the first election after the introduction of PR in New Zealand was deemed to hamper the coalition because it provided insufficient flexibility for the partners. The subsequent coalition agreement was therefore significantly smaller in size. On the other hand, a 2006 review of Scottish executive budgets found that the partnership agreement between Labour and the Liberal Democrats had created problems in managing budgets and setting priorities: here, the limited detail in the coalition deal at the outset was thought to have been a significant weakness that undermined its effectiveness in the medium and long-term.

Having secured 20 ministers across government, including five in the cabinet, the Liberal Democrats are well placed within the government. Compared to most coalition arrangements elsewhere, particularly those in Europe, the Liberal Democrats have fared well and better than their share of the seats in Parliament would justify in most other countries. This may contribute helpfully to the bonds of trust between the parties, and particularly between the leaders. However, international evidence suggests that the minor party partner – and particularly the party leader - will need additional political advice and support if they are to be able to carry out their coalition role, helping them to manage the issues and tensions as and when they arise, on top of the normal ministerial responsibilities attached to their policy portfolio. Unhelpfully, however, the additional injection of such resources would run counter to the parties' stated desire to cut the cost of politics and reduce the number of unaccountable advisers.

The pace of government will also necessarily slow as decisions have to be agreed between the partners before being announced, and this may generate new pressures in the 24/7 media cycle. International experience would also suggest that the cabinet is likely to become a rubber-stamp, ratifying decisions agreed elsewhere within the coalition machinery. Similarly, contrary to what the public say they want, the 'new politics' will likely result in a more quiescent House of Commons and House of Lords - there is limited scope for tolerating independently minded backbenchers when each party within a coalition has had to make significant policy concessions.

In terms of an exit strategy much has been made of the coalition's proposal to move to a five-year fixed term Parliament supported by a requirement that 55% of MPs will be needed to support an early dissolution of Parliament. There are good reasons to reform the prerogative power and introduce a fixed term Parliament, not least to make the calling of the general election date fairer on all parties. And clearly it provides the minor partner with necessary reassurance that the rug will not be pulled from under them by a Prime Minister seeking an early general election. However, compared to comparative Westminster-style legislatures a five-year fixed term is at the upper end of the parliamentary scale: most tend to have four-year fixed terms (New Zealand's three-year term being a rare exception).

Most legislatures also have an exit mechanism to bring the Parliament to an end if the government cannot complete the full term. Scotland has a 66% vote threshold for MSPs to support the dissolution of Parliament, significantly higher than that proposed for Westminster. However, it was also intended that the four-year election cycle for the Scottish Parliament would only be cancelled if a new election took place less than six months beforehand. Wales, in contrast, has no early dissolution mechanism. And an alternative approach entirely can be found in Germany: its constructive no-confidence approach requires not just that a no- confidence motion be won but also that the instigators of the no-confidence motion also nominate an alternative government.

While the principle of a fixed term Parliament and an exit mechanism therefore have resonance in international experience, the proposed detail of the reforms for Westminster are somewhat different and will likely continue to present the coalition with a political and constitutional headache.

Dr Ruth Fox is director of the Parliament & Government Programme at the Hansard Society